We have implemented the most powerful individual-photon attack against the Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution protocol. Our measurement results are in good agreement with theoretical predictions for the eavesdropper's Rényi information. In 1984 Bennett and Brassard [1] proposed a protocol (BB84) for quantum key distribution (QKD) in which the sender (Alice) transmits single-photon pulses to the receiver (Bob) in such a way that security is vouchsafed by physical laws. Since then, the amount of information gained by an eavesdropper (Eve) under ideal BB84 operating conditions has been a fundamental question. Papers by Fuchs and Peres [2], Slutsky et al. [3] , and Brandt [4] show that the most powerful individual-photon attack can be accomplished with a controlled-not (cnot) gate. As illustrated in Fig. 1 , Eve supplies the target qubit to the cnot gate, which entangles it with the BB84 qubit that Alice is sending to Bob. Eve then makes her measurement of the target qubit to obtain information on the shared key bit at the expense of imposing detectable errors (probability P E ) between Alice and Bob [4] . We have recently shown [5] that this Fuchs-Peres-Brandt (FPB) entangling probe can be implemented using single-photon two-qubit (SPTQ) quantum logic in a proof-of-principle experiment, see Fig. 2 . In SPTQ logic a single photon carries two independent qubits: the polarization and the momentum (or spatial orientation) states of the photon. SPTQ gates are deterministic and SPTQ logic affords a simple yet powerful tool to investigate few-qubit quantum information processing tasks. In Fig. 2 , we start with a pair of polarization-entangled photons in the singlet state (Ψ − ). Photon 1 is used as a trigger to herald photon 2 as a single-photon pulse for the BB84 protocol and to initialize the probe qubit. A swap operation applied to photon 2 exchanges its polarization and momentum qubits so that the polarization of photon 1 and the momentum of photon 2 are now entangled in a singlet state. Eve encodes her probe qubit in the momentum state of photon 2 by projecting photon 1 along an appropriate polarization state set by a polarization rotation R E . The polarization state of photon 2 after the swap gate is Alice's qubit, which is set by rotation R A . Similarly, Bob's polarization analysis of Alice's qubit is set by R B . The cnot gate in Fig. 2 is preceded by a −π/8 rotation and followed by a +π/8 rotation because the basis for the cnot's control qubit is rotated by π/8 from the BB84 bases. The cnot gate that Eve employs is a polarization-controlled not (p-cnot) gate that uses the polarization qubit as the control and the momentum qubit of the same photon as the target. Fig. 3 shows our experimental setup for implementing the quantum circuit. We used a bidirectionally pumped Sagnac interferometric down-conversion source [6] to generate polarization-entangled photons in the singlet state with ∼99.45% quantum-interference visibility. Eve's R E polarization rotation was implemented using a quarter-wave plate (QWP) Q1 and a half-wave plate (HWP) H1, followed by H-polarized singlephoton detection (D1) through polarizing beam splitter (PBS) P1. Q1 was used to compensate an intrinsic phase shift imposed by the swap gate on the target-qubit basis. After the swap gate, R A and R −π/8 were a787_1.pdf QML6.pdf ©OSA 1-55752-834-9
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In data collection, we measured coincidences between D1 and one of the detectors for photon 2. To compare the experiment and theory, we calculated the Rényi information I R that Eve derives about the sift events in which Bob correctly measures Alice's qubit. Fig. 4 plots I R as a function of the error probability P E for the ideal case (solid squares, solid line), for the measured values with inputs in the H-V basis (solid diamonds, solid line), and for the measured values with inputs in the ±45
• basis (solid triangles, solid line). Dashed lines in Fig. 4 represent the calculated I R values that were obtained by data fitting that accounted for wave-plate angle-setting errors up to the rotation mounts' resolution, and the p-cnot gate's (separatelymeasured) 95% classical visibility. In the ideal case with P E = 0, Eve gets no information, I R = 0, and Alice and Bob have no erroneous bits. However, due to experimental errors such as imperfect gate fidelities, we measured ∼5% of the sifted bits to be in error when our experiment was set for P E = 0. For P E = 1/3, Eve obtains perfect information, I R = 1, but in our experiment, Eve gained a maximum I R = 0.9 or, on average, Eve gained 95% of the correct information about Bob's error-free sifted bits in this case.
In summary, we have demonstrated experimentally the first complete physical simulation of the entanglingprobe attack, showing that Eve can gain Rényi information of up to 0.9 under realistic operating conditions, including a cnot gate that does not have an ultrahigh fidelity. Our results suggest the possible amount of information gained by Eve with current technology and the need to evaluate the required level of privacy amplification.
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